European Central Bank — Policy Preview

European Central Bank (Governing Council) — 2026-09-10
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European Central Bank — Policy Preview

Decision due: 10 September 2026, 14:15 CEST · Current deposit facility rate: 2.25%

Policy rate — decided steps2023 → today2.1333.87last decision · 23 Jul2.25%

1. Executive summary

The Governing Council is expected to raise the deposit facility rate by 25bp to 2.50% at the 10 September decision. The single most important driver is the new staff macroeconomic projections, which must incorporate the energy-driven firming in headline HICP to 3.3% (core eased to 2.4%) and judge whether energy-driven pressures will sustain second-round effects into 2027. The key risk is that the projections reveal core measures cooling faster than expected, which would complicate any restrictive tilt in the press conference.

2. The call

Surveyed economist consensus is for a 25bp hike to 2.50%. We agree. Although core is easing, negotiated wages are slowing and retail sales have missed expectations. The firming in headline inflation to 3.3% and the need to guard against second-round effects from energy prices support resuming the tightening cycle now rather than waiting until October or December. The 23 July decision left the deposit facility rate at 2.25% after the June tightening, with the July account noting that markets had already built in further moves through early 2027. The fresh projection round, combined with the August HICP release where headline firmed while core eased only modestly and remains above target, supports a move at this meeting. A hold would require a materially softer inflation path in the new forecasts than the committee appeared to anticipate in July; absent that, the base case is a hike followed by data-dependent tightening thereafter. The conviction is moderate: core is easing, so any signal that the new projections are lowering the medium-term inflation trajectory could shift the reaction function dovishly at the margin.

3. The committee

Lean labels summarise RoboMacro's read of each member's public communications over the past six months, from Hawkish to Dovish. A lean is only assigned where recent remarks carry a monetary-policy stance: 14 of 27 members currently qualify (Lagarde, Vujčić, Cipollone, Elderson, Lane, Schnabel, Kažimír, Kocher, Makhlouf, Nagel, Panetta, Radev, Rehn, Stournaras).

Member Role Lean
Christine Lagarde President Hawkish
Boris Vujčić Vice-President Leans hawkish
Piero Cipollone Executive Board Member Neutral
Frank Elderson Executive Board Member Neutral
Philip Lane Chief Economist, Executive Board Leans hawkish
Isabel Schnabel Executive Board Member Hawkish
Alexander Demarco Governor, Central Bank of Malta Coverage gap
Primož Dolenc Governor, Banka Slovenije No policy signal
José Luis Escrivá Governor, Banco de España No policy signal
Ülo Kaasik Governor, Eesti Pank (Estonia) Coverage gap
Mārtiņš Kazāks Governor, Latvijas Banka Coverage gap
Peter Kažimír Governor, National Bank of Slovakia Hawkish
Martin Kocher Governor, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austria) Neutral
Gabriel Makhlouf Governor, Central Bank of Ireland Hawkish
Emmanuel Moulin Governor, Banque de France No policy signal
Joachim Nagel President, Deutsche Bundesbank (Germany) Leans hawkish
Fabio Panetta Governor, Banca d'Italia Leans hawkish
Christodoulos Patsalides Governor, Central Bank of Cyprus No policy signal
Álvaro Santos Pereira Governor, Banco de Portugal Coverage gap
Dimitar Radev Governor, Bulgarian National Bank Leans hawkish
Olli Rehn Governor, Bank of Finland Leans hawkish
Gaston Reinesch Governor, Banque centrale du Luxembourg No regular speeches
Olaf Sleijpen President, De Nederlandsche Bank No policy signal
Yannis Stournaras Governor, Bank of Greece Leans hawkish
Pierre Wunsch Governor, National Bank of Belgium Coverage gap
Gediminas Šimkus Chairman, Bank of Lithuania Coverage gap
Ante Žigman Governor, Croatian National Bank Coverage gap
Committee hawk/dove — scored communications2023-11 → today · monthly composite0hawkishdovish23 Jul-0.07members today (speech/vote basis, sample-gated)CipolloneKocherEldersonRadevLanePanettaStournarasRehnNagelVujčićLagardeMakhloufSchnabelKažimír

The balance remains restrictive, with Schnabel, Kažimír, Makhlouf and Lagarde anchoring the tighter wing and Vujčić, Lane, Nagel, Panetta, Radev, Rehn and Stournaras providing additional support for tightening. Cipollone, Elderson and Kocher sit nearer neutral. Recent institutional changes still matter: Vujčić, Moulin, Kaasik and Žigman are all within their first few meetings, so their influence is still forming through the discussion rather than through a long public record. With decisions taken by consensus and no votes published, the communication record is the gauge of differentiation. The July account and the new projections are the dominant signals for the 10 September decision.

4. Data since the last decision

Indicator Latest Consensus Surprise Prior Δ
HICP inflation (YoY) 3.3% (Aug, rel. 01 Sep) 3.3% +0.0pp 2.9% (Jul) +0.4pp
Core HICP (YoY) 2.4% (Aug, rel. 01 Sep) 2.5% -0.1pp 2.5% (Jul) -0.1pp
Real GDP growth (QoQ) 0.6% (Q2, rel. 07 Sep) 0.4% +0.2pp 0.0% (Q1, revised) +0.6pp
Unemployment rate 6.4% (Jul, rel. 01 Sep) 6.3% +0.1pp 6.4% (Jun, revised) +0.0pp
Employment change (QoQ) 0.1% (Q2, rel. 07 Sep) 0.1% +0.0pp 0.1% (Q1) +0.0pp
Negotiated wage growth (YoY) 2.44% (Q2, rel. 21 Aug) 2.56% (Q1, revised) -0.12pp
Labour cost index (YoY) 3.0% (Q2, rel. 20 Aug) 3.2% (Q1) -0.2pp
Manufacturing PMI 52.7 (Aug, rel. 01 Sep) 52.8 -0.1pt 51.9 (Jul) +0.8pt
Services PMI 51.6 (Aug, rel. 03 Sep) 51.7 -0.1pt 51.7 (Jul) -0.1pt
EC economic sentiment 98.4 (Aug, rel. 28 Aug) 97.5 +0.9pt 97.1 (Jul, revised) +1.3pt
ZEW economic sentiment 31.4 (Aug, rel. 18 Aug) 25.4 +6.0pt 23.4 (Jul) +8.0pt
Consumer confidence -15.5 (Aug, rel. 28 Aug) -15.5 +0.0pt -15.9 (Jul) +0.4pt
Industrial production (YoY) 0.1% (Jun, rel. 13 Aug) -0.8% +0.9pp -0.1% (May, revised) +0.2pp
Retail sales (YoY) 0.6% (Jul, rel. 04 Sep) 1.1% -0.5pp 1.4% (Jun, revised) -0.8pp
ECB consumer inflation expectations (1Y) 2.9% (Jul, rel. 21 Aug) 3.0% (Jun) -0.1pp
Trade balance 8.6bn EUR (Jun, rel. 14 Aug) -2.2bn EUR +10.8bn -9.0bn EUR (May, revised) +17.6bn
Output gap (RoboMacro model estimate) -0.62pp (2026-Q1) -0.26pp (2025-Q4) -0.36pp
EUR/USD (daily close) 1.1635 (09 Sep) 1.1414 (22 Jul) +1.9%
Brent crude oil (USD/bbl) 95.92 (04 Sep) 94.05 (22 Jul) +2.0%
2Y government yield (Bund, DE) (weekly snapshot) 2.93% (07 Sep) 2.83% (22 Jul) +10bp
10Y government yield (Bund, DE) (weekly snapshot) 3.34% (07 Sep) 3.18% (22 Jul) +16bp

No new release since the last decision for: Output gap (RoboMacro model estimate) — the committee sees the same print(s) it saw last time. Market rows are measured from the 22 Jul close — the last observation common to every market series on or before the last decision. Priors marked "revised" are the source's current vintage for that period, which differs from the figure as first published.

HICP inflation (YoY)23 Jul3.3%Core HICP (YoY)23 Jul2.4%Unemployment rate23 Jul6.4%Manufacturing PMI23 Jul52.7Services PMI23 Jul51.6gold = printed since the last decision

The data present two distinct signals. Headline HICP rose 0.4pp to 3.3% in August, in line with expectations but confirming the energy-driven rebound (energy component rising sharply while services eased and ex-energy was unchanged) the July account had already flagged as an upside risk. Core HICP, by contrast, eased to 2.4%. Unemployment remained at 6.4%. Manufacturing and services PMI were mixed. Brent crude oil rose sharply in late July before partially retracing.

Taken together, the prints tilt the near-term inflation outlook higher on the headline measure while core has eased but remains above target. Momentum in activity and sentiment is improving but from a low base. The inflation trajectory is doing the decisive work for the call at this meeting and argues for a restrictive stance.

No new release since the last decision for: Output gap (RoboMacro model estimate) — the committee sees the same print(s) it saw last time. Market rows are measured from the 22 Jul close — the last observation common to every market series on or before the last decision. Priors marked "revised" are the source's current vintage for that period, which differs from the figure as first published.

daily closes · window since the last decisionEUR/USD23 Julhigh 1.17 · 21 Aug1.16Brent crude oil (USD/bbl)23 Julhigh 100.76 · 23 Jul95.92

5. What the speeches say

Key excerpts

Committee-member speeches published since the last decision. Dates are publication dates.

Boris Vujčić
published 1 September 2026
“Monetary policy is, by its nature, forward-looking. We track inflation, wages, consumption, credit and financial conditions.”
“This research has improved our understanding of expectations formation and its role in shaping aggregate economic outcomes.”
“Surveys help in yet another way. They allow central banks to listen to the public.”
Piero Cipollone
published 24 August 2026
“monetary policy action needs to be well calibrated”
“the risk is rather remote... economy is slowing, it is proving to be more resilient than expected, while inflation remains in line with the baseline scenario”
“central banks cannot do much to address increases in energy commodity prices, but they can ensure that these increases are not reflected in medium-term inflation expectations”
Philip Lane
published 17 August 2026
“the implications of artificial intelligence (AI) for the monetary policy stance.”
“the advent and adoption of AI could put upward pressure on inflation via this demand mechanism”
“the inflationary effects of the AI transition will depend on a range of factors.”
Yannis Stournaras
published 17 August 2026
“uncertainty surrounding inflation forecasts and therefore, the challenges that monetary policy has to face.”
“annual inflation in the Euro area fell to an unexpected 2.8% in June 2026 from 3,2% in May.”
“The critical question, however, is what happens after the RRF.”
Philip Lane
published 17 August 2026
“the implications of artificial intelligence (AI) for the monetary policy stance.”
“the advent and adoption of AI could put upward pressure on inflation via this demand mechanism”
“the inflationary effects of the AI transition will depend on a range of factors.”
Joachim Nagel
published 10 August 2026
“on the digital euro, as the heart of a sovereign European payment system”
“on the savings and investments union, as the driver of a competitive Europe”
“We are currently getting the euro into shape to take on that role”
Fabio Panetta
published 10 August 2026
“This environment requires more than a recalibration of the policy stance. It calls for a periodic review of how we examine the inflation outlook, assess the stance and adjust the reaction function.”
“They are forces that continuously reshape the environment in which households, firms and policymakers operate.”
“More importantly, they can alter structural relations in the economy, including the transmission of monetary policy itself.”
Fabio Panetta
published 31 July 2026
“Inflation is currently hovering around 3 per cent and is expected to remain above that level until early 2027.”
“In the euro area, higher energy costs have compounded a situation already marked by low growth.”
“The first is the shock triggered by the conflict in the Middle East, which has led to higher energy prices, heightened uncertainty and renewed concerns about supply chain bottlenecks.”
Gabriel Makhlouf
published 30 July 2026
“Price stability is not negotiable, but it requires credible fiscal commitment to debt stabilisation.”
“Such a scenario has obvious implications for price stability, particularly if the economy has little slack.”
“the ECB will never have to choose between its mandate and other goals”
Fabio Panetta
published 30 July 2026
“Artificial intelligence (AI) is no longer a distant prospect.”
“This is where the financial system comes in. Without adequate finance, innovation remains just an idea.”
“We must strengthen our ability to mobilize capital towards firms that innovate, grow and transform research into practical applications.”
Peter Kažimír
published 27 July 2026
“Risks to the inflation outlook – both headline and core – remain tilted to the upside.”
“I remain of the view that at least one more hike will be needed as part of our measured adjustment to inflation risks.”
“Incoming data and geopolitical developments would need to be very convincing to do for me not to advocate another hike in September.”

Recent communications since the July decision have covered household expectations, tokenisation infrastructure and structural challenges for monetary policy. Vujčić’s lecture published 1 September focused on household expectations surveys, communication effectiveness and transmission mechanics; no policy stance, rate outlook, inflation assessment or directional signal is expressed. Schnabel and Cipollone, in speeches published 28 and 26 August respectively, spoke exclusively about tokenisation and DLT infrastructure. In an interview published 24 August, Cipollone described stagflation risks as rather remote, the economy as more resilient than expected and inflation as in line with the baseline scenario, stressing that policy needs to be well calibrated to avoid further damping growth. Panetta in remarks published 10 August discussed structural challenges and the need for a periodic review of how the inflation outlook is examined without signaling any current policy stance, easing bias or inflation concerns. These remarks form part of the communication record since the July decision. The July account noted that inflation continues to moderate but medium-term compensation stays above target amid persistent energy and geopolitical upside risks. Growth is modest with a resilient but softening labour market. Markets have repriced additional tightening into the curve through early 2027 while the fiscal stance remains broadly neutral. The new projections are the binding input for the 10 September decision.

6. Scenarios

Scenario Trigger Rate path
Base case Projections confirm energy-driven inflation persistence into 2027 with only gradual core deceleration 25bp hike to 2.50% at this meeting followed by data-dependent tightening to maintain restrictive stance
Stronger second-round effects New forecasts lift medium-term inflation and compensation measures materially above baseline 25bp hike plus explicit tightening bias in the press conference
Faster disinflation Projections show core HICP and wages cooling more rapidly while growth momentum fades Hold at 2.25%; dovish tilt in the statement and Q&A

7. Into the meeting

The new staff projections will dominate, with any upward revision to the 2027 inflation profile or a shift in risks providing the main restrictive lever. Lagarde’s opening remarks and the subsequent Q&A will be scrutinised for language on calibration, the weight placed on core versus headline, and whether the reaction function still embeds further tightening. Markets will focus on the implied path through the December meeting and any commentary on the euro’s recent appreciation. The September flash HICP lands on 2 October, nearly four weeks before the 29 October decision. Full analysis on the RoboMacro site → /central-banks/ECB

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