Federal Reserve System (Federal Open Market Committee) — 2026-09-16
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United States — Federal Reserve
Decision due: 16 September, 14:00 EDT · Current federal funds target range: 3.50-3.75%
1. Executive summary
The United States Federal Reserve is expected to raise the federal funds target range by 25bp to 3.75-4.00% at the 16 September decision. The single most important driver is core PCE still 3.3 percent after more than five years above target, reinforced by the rise in energy and oil prices since July and Warsh's Jackson Hole test ("clearly and at sufficient speed… otherwise we have work to do"). Fed-funds futures price the hike at about 90-92 percent; 85 percent of economists in the latest Reuters poll are on the same call. The live question is hike versus hold in the vote. The new Summary of Economic Projections and dot plot are released with the 14:00 EDT package and cannot produce a hold at this meeting — they show whether the committee then validates follow-through. Futures imply about 60-65bp of cumulative tightening from the current effective rate through March: this hike plus roughly one and a half more, not three additional moves.
2. The call
Fed-funds futures price about a 90-92 percent chance of a 25bp rise to 3.75-4.00%; 85 percent of economists in the latest Reuters poll are on the same call. The July decision was a 9-3 hold, with Presidents Hammack, Kashkari and Logan dissenting in favour of an immediate 25bp hike. The base case is a 25bp hike at this meeting, though a close vote cannot be ruled out given differentiated views among participants. From today's effective rate, the curve prices roughly 60-65bp of cumulative tightening through March. The new SEP and dot plot drop with the statement and will show whether that path is validated — they are not an input to today's vote.
3. The committee
Lean labels summarise RoboMacro's read of each member's public communications over the past six months, from Hawkish to Dovish. A lean is assigned where recent remarks carry a monetary-policy stance, or where a recorded vote is a dissent, hike or cut: 19 of 19 members currently qualify (Warsh, Jefferson, Barr, Bowman, Cook, Powell, Waller, Hammack, Kashkari, Logan, Paulson, Williams, Barkin, Collins, Daly, Goolsbee, Musalem, Schmid, Venable). Where the bank's attributed minutes record a stance more recently than the speech record, the minutes take precedence — marked "(minutes)" (Waller, Paulson).
Member
Role
Lean
Last vote
Kevin Warsh
Chair
Hawkish
Voted hold (Jul)
Philip Jefferson
Vice Chair, Board of Governors
Leans hawkish
Voted hold (Jul)
Michael Barr
Governor
Hawkish
Voted hold (Jul)
Michelle Bowman
Vice Chair for Supervision
Neutral
Voted hold (Jul)
Lisa Cook
Governor
Hawkish
Voted hold (Jul)
Jerome Powell
Governor
Neutral
Voted hold (Jul)
Christopher Waller
Governor
Conditional — hold if cooling (latest)
Voted hold (Jul)
Beth Hammack
President, Cleveland Fed
Hawkish
Voted +25bp (Jul)
Neel Kashkari
President, Minneapolis Fed
Hawkish dissent
Voted +25bp (Jul)
Lorie Logan
President, Dallas Fed
Hawkish
Voted +25bp (Jul)
Anna Paulson
President, Philadelphia Fed
Data-dependent / open mind (latest)
Voted hold (Jul)
John Williams
President, NY Fed; Vice Chair of the FOMC
Leans hawkish
Voted hold (Jul)
Thomas Barkin
President, Richmond Fed (non-voting)
Leans hawkish
—
Susan Collins
President, Boston Fed (non-voting)
Hawkish
—
Mary Daly
President, San Francisco Fed (non-voting)
Neutral
—
Austan Goolsbee
President, Chicago Fed (non-voting)
Leans hawkish
—
Alberto Musalem
President, St. Louis Fed (non-voting)
Hawkish
—
Jeff Schmid
President, Kansas City Fed (non-voting)
Hawkish
—
Cheryl Venable
Interim President, Atlanta Fed (non-voting)
Hawkish
—
Kevin Warsh is now in his third meeting as Chair following the May leadership transition. The committee balance has shifted hawkish since the June unanimous hold, culminating in the three dissents at the July meeting. The speech record since the last decision is dominated by inflation concerns, with explicit openness to further tightening from Cook, Collins, Schmid, Hammack, Barr and Jefferson. Warsh’s own emphasis on price stability as the predominant focus, the level of core PCE, the rise in oil since July and Warsh's Jackson Hole test point to a committee that may act if the new projections do not show clear progress toward the 2% target.
4. Data since the last decision
Indicator
Latest
Consensus
Surprise
Prior
Δ
CPI inflation (YoY)
3.4% (Aug, rel. 11 Sep)
3.4%
+0.0pp
3.4% (Jul)
+0.0pp
Core CPI (YoY)
2.4% (Aug, rel. 11 Sep)
2.4%
+0.0pp
2.5% (Jul)
-0.1pp
Core PCE (YoY, target gauge)
3.3% (Jul, rel. 26 Aug)
3.3%
+0.0pp
3.3% (Jun)
+0.0pp
Real GDP growth (QoQ annualised)
1.5% (Q2, rel. 26 Aug)
1.5%
+0.0pp
2.1% (Q1)
-0.6pp
Nonfarm payrolls
162k (Aug, rel. 04 Sep)
56k
+106k
21k (Jul, revised)
+141k
Unemployment rate
4.1% (Aug, rel. 04 Sep)
4.1%
+0.0pp
4.1% (Jul)
+0.0pp
Average hourly earnings (YoY)
3.1% (Aug, rel. 04 Sep)
3.0%
+0.1pp
3.2% (Jul)
-0.1pp
ISM Manufacturing PMI
54.6 (Aug, rel. 01 Sep)
55.2
-0.6pt
55.6 (Jul)
-1.0pt
Services PMI (ISM)
55.4 (Aug, rel. 03 Sep)
54.3
+1.1pt
54.1 (Jul)
+1.3pt
Industrial production (YoY)
1.1% (Jul, rel. 18 Aug)
—
—
1.3% (Jun, revised)
-0.2pp
Retail sales (MoM)
1.2% (Aug, rel. 16 Sep)
0.8%
+0.4pp
-0.5% (Jul, revised)
+1.7pp
NFIB small-business optimism
98.7 (Aug, rel. 08 Sep)
99.3
-0.6pt
99.8 (Jul)
-1.1pt
Michigan consumer sentiment
47.8 (Sep, rel. 11 Sep)
51.0
-3.2pt
51.7 (Aug)
-3.9pt
Employment cost index (QoQ)
0.9% (Q2, rel. 31 Jul)
0.8%
+0.1pp
0.9% (Q1)
+0.0pp
Trade balance
-88.6bn USD (Jul, rel. 03 Sep)
-90.0bn USD
+1.4bn
-71.2bn USD (Jun, revised)
-17.4bn
Output gap (RoboMacro model estimate)
+0.82pp (2026-Q2)
—
—
+0.98pp (2026-Q1)
-0.16pp
Broad dollar index (NY noon)
118.2 (11 Sep)
—
—
120.8 (29 Jul)
-2.2%
WTI crude oil (USD/bbl)
101.89 (14 Sep)
—
—
86.08 (29 Jul)
+18.4%
2Y government yield
4.67% (15 Sep)
—
—
4.22% (29 Jul)
+45bp
10Y government yield
5.00% (15 Sep)
—
—
4.67% (29 Jul)
+33bp
No new release since the last decision for: Output gap (RoboMacro model estimate) — the committee sees the same print(s) it saw last time. Market rows are measured from the 29 Jul close — the last observation common to every market series on or before the last decision. Priors marked "revised" are the source's current vintage for that period, which differs from the figure as first published.
The data since the last decision present a mixed inflation picture. Headline CPI held at 3.4%, held up by energy (about +16% year-over-year). Core CPI rose 0.3 percent on the month against a 0.2 percent consensus — that monthly beat is what moved the market; the 2.4 percent year-over-year print was in line and is the lowest since March 2021. The target gauge of core PCE remained stuck at 3.3% in July. The labour market is not loosening, with one strong payroll print in August beating expectations by 106k but with composition caveats from leisure and hospitality and local-government education, prior-month revisions that merely erased a July decline, and a three-month average near 70k; average hourly earnings surprised to the upside but wage growth eased to 3.1%; the unemployment rate was unchanged at 4.1%. Real GDP growth slowed and several sentiment gauges weakened, yet services PMI strengthened and the output gap the committee already had in July remains positive. WTI crude oil reached 101.89 on 14 September. The CPI–PCE gap and the energy contribution to the headline, the level of core PCE, and the recent oil rise are doing the decisive work; the labour market is not loosening and the recent payroll strength outweighs the softer activity prints in shaping the outlook for demand pressure over the next two to three quarters.
5. What the speeches say
Key excerpts
Committee-member speeches published since the last decision. Dates are publication dates.
“inflation remains meaningfully above the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) 2 percent goal”
“if inflation comes in hot, I would consider a rate hike”
“I judge that policy is currently only slightly restricting aggregate demand, and it may not take much acceleration in inflation to nudge me into supporting tighter policy”
“But with inflation still too high, I remain particularly concerned about the price stability portion of the dual mandate.”
“Should evidence of sustained inflation progress not materialize, I believe it will be appropriate to tighten policy soon to ensure we deliver price stability in a reasonable time frame.”
“Without such evidence, it will be more difficult to rule out other inflationary forces being at play – including the possibility that firms’ price-setting behavior has become inconsistent with 2 percent inflation.”
“Inflation is too high. This has been my long-held view”
“I consider the risks to the inflation side of the dual mandate higher than the risks to the employment side at this point. As such, I am prepared to act by raising rates, if necessary.”
“With five years of above-target inflation, the risk grows that higher inflation may become entrenched... we do not have that luxury in this one.”
“The inflation mystery is not whether inflation will come back to our 2 percent target or not... The open question is how it gets there. Will the Fed need to raise rates further, or is inflation already on a path down to target?”
“There’s a counterargument, however, that says the elevated inflation we see today is more embedded... If true, this argument suggests help is needed to bring inflation all the way back down to target... Alternatively, help may need to come from the Fed.”
“Inflation is still over our target... June headline PCE inflation was 3.7 percent. Core PCE came in at 3.3 percent.”
“Inflation is too high, and it has exceeded the FOMC's goal of 2 percent for more than five years.”
“are the pressures pushing prices higher likely to recede in coming months? Will inflation then resume its moderation to 2 percent absent a change in monetary policy?”
“Much depends on unpredictable geopolitical events, particularly the Middle East conflict.”
“Inflation is too high. This has been my long-held view”
“I consider the risks to the inflation side of the dual mandate higher than the risks to the employment side at this point. As such, I am prepared to act by raising rates, if necessary.”
“If I do not see signs of continued disinflation soon, I am prepared to act.”
“my focus is squarely on inflation that remains too high”
“Inflation has been too high for too long”
“I do not see the current stance of monetary policy as restrictive. As such, I believe that bringing inflation down to the Fed’s 2 percent objective will require tighter policy”
“Inflation is unquestionably too high at about 4 percent, well above the FOMC's longer-run goal of 2 percent.”
“it is imperative that we restore it to the Federal Reserve's 2 percent longer-run goal on a sustained basis.”
“I remain firmly committed to achieving the Federal Reserve's goals of maximum employment and bringing inflation down to our 2 percent longer-run goal on a sustained basis.”
“As bank regulators and supervisors, the Federal Reserve has a role to play in encouraging responsible innovation while maintaining a safe and sound banking system.”
“our goal must be to support responsible AI innovation”
“responsible innovation and financial inclusion go hand in hand”
“The quick succession of shocks raises the risk that inflation becomes entrenched and inflation expectations become unanchored.”
“in a scenario where actual inflation does not start to cool down soon, I believe that it could be appropriate to reconsider our current policy stance to ensure we fulfill our commitment to deliver price stability.”
“This supply shock is occurring in an environment in which inflation has already been above the FOMC's target for some time”
“I dissented in favor of raising the federal funds rate.”
“Inflation has been too high for too long.”
“I am not confident it will return to our objective on its own.”
Anna Paulson — August 2026 essay and CNBC interview
as of 4 August 2026
the July hold 'was not a close call'
policy as mildly restrictive, and kept an 'open mind'
The speech record since the last decision shows repeated emphasis on inflation remaining above target for more than five years, with associated risks of entrenchment. Members including Barr, Cook, Collins, Schmid, Hammack, Jefferson, Warsh and Venable have highlighted the need for confidence that inflation is moving clearly toward the target or that further policy tightening may be required. Waller has judged that policy is only slightly restrictive and has conditioned support for a hike on inflation coming in hot, while urging to give disinflation a chance. Barkin floated the possibility that the Fed may need to raise rates further if inflation is embedded. Bowman’s two speeches contained no monetary-policy content. Paulson indicated that the July hold was not a close call, described policy as mildly restrictive and said she has an open mind. The most recent communications from Waller (3 September) and Barr (1 September) continue to stress upside inflation risks.
6. Scenarios
June SEP context
The June 2026 Summary of Economic Projections already contained a 2026 hike. Median federal-funds rate 3.8% at end-2026, 3.6% at end-2027 and 3.4% at end-2028, against a current midpoint of 3.625%. Today's vote is hike versus hold. The September dots, released with the statement, then show whether the committee validates further tightening in 2026-27 or lifts the longer-run rate.
Scenario
Trigger
Rate path
Base case
Majority for a hike, with dots that validate some follow-through
25bp hike to 3.75-4.00% at this meeting, with the median path consistent with roughly one further move by March
Stronger entrenchment risk
Hike plus a median dot plot that shifts the 2026 and 2027 paths higher still
25bp hike and a more hawkish 2026-27 path than the 60-65bp through March already in the curve
Hold
A majority stays at 3.50-3.75%, most likely if the committee treats the oil rise as transitory and sides with Waller
hold at 3.50-3.75%; the dots then show whether 2027 still has a modest easing bias
7. Into the meeting
The statement is likely to retain its shortened Warsh-era form while underlining that inflation remains well above target and that the risks to the inflation outlook are skewed to the upside. The Summary of Economic Projections and dot plot will be the primary vehicles for forward guidance; any upward shift in the median path for 2026 and 2027 or in the longer-run dot will be the decisive signal. Chair Warsh’s press conference will be scrutinised for language on the task-force reviews of the framework and communications, the extent to which recent oil and tariff effects are judged transitory, and whether the Committee still views the current stance as only slightly restrictive. After the decision the August core PCE on 30 September, the Q2 GDP final estimate and the August personal-spending data will be the most important releases; the FOMC minutes follow on 7 October. None of these can affect the September vote or the SEP submitted at it.